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VALUATION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 
WJ du Plessis  
Which way you ought to go depends on where you want to get to... 
- Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland1 
1 Introduction 
The Constitution established a single system of law shaped by the Constitution 
itself. 2  It protected certain existing rights but it also initiated certain reform 
measures. In laying the foundation for transformation, the Constitution requires 
that both the existing rights and the reforms must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights in line with section 39(2). However, existing rights can 
be protected only insofar as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights.3 If the 
existing rights conflict with reform measures, then the Constitution requires a 
balancing of these rights and measures. 
The protection of vested rights and transformation-orientated reforms do not have 
to stand opposed to each other, but are interlinked and "form part of one single 
legal constitutional goal".4 Pre-1994 legislation such as the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975 (hereafter the Expropriation Act) and common law protecting vested rights 
are still valid, but only insofar as they are reconcilable with the Constitution.5 This 
is also true for the calculation of compensation for expropriation: the assessment 
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1  Carroll Alice's Adventures 89. 
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methods employed before the adoption of the Constitution are valid only in so far 
as they are not in conflict with the Constitution. 
In an effort to bring the legislation in line with the Constitution, the Expropriation 
Bill B4-2015 (hereafter the Expropriation Bill) 6  is currently before parliament, 
bringing the issue inter alia of the calculation of compensation into consideration. 
The Expropriation Bill has been met with opposition in parliament on the grounds 
that it threatens property rights in South Africa and would allow for compensation 
at lower than market value.7 
Where pre-constitutional expropriation law aimed at compensating at market value, 
the new constitutional order aims for "just and equitable" compensation. The call 
has been made for a "transformative, constitutional legal culture of expropriation",8 
but there was a further call for providing specific tools for judges to use in order 
for them to be able to come to an acceptable conclusion in specific cases.9 
This article will firstly provide a critique of the notion that market value is objective, 
the be-all and end-all of calculating compensation, and will secondly provide 
guidelines to use when calculating compensation. In doing this it is necessary to 
look at the rationale offered by courts for paying compensation upon expropriation, 
before looking at the centrality of the market value, pre-constitution. It will be 
argued that under the Constitution, market value still occupies a central space. 
Thereafter different compensation methods will be discussed to show how the 
choice of valuation method can influence the substantive property goal 
                                        
6  Also see the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 that aims "[t]o provide for the establishment, 
functions and powers of the Office of the Valuer-General" to help with the regulation of the 
valuation of property in the context of land reform, as well as property that the Department (of 
Rural Development and Land Reform) wants to acquire or dispose of. The Act provides a 
framework for "fair and consistent land values", and aims to set norms, standards and 
guidelines for the validation of the integrity of valuation data by shifting the focus from "market 
value" to "fair compensation". See National Assembly 2014 
https://pmg.org.za/hansard/18525/. It does not, however, deal with the methods of calculating 
compensation and due to space restrictions will not be discussed in this article. 
7  See National Assembly 2014 https://pmg.org.za/hansard/18525/. 
8  Du Plessis Compensation for Expropriation 300. 
9  Sluysmans, Verbist and De Graaff 2014 EPLJ 29. 




compensation wishes to reach, where after the conclusion will provide for a 
different framework. 
2 Calculation of compensation before the Constitution 
2.1 The rationale for paying compensation 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the assessment of compensation was based 
on the assumption that the legislator did not intend to take away rights without 
compensation, and in cases where there was doubt whether or not compensation 
was payable, that assumption tipped the balance in favour of payment.10 A single 
individual or small group could not be required without compensation to sacrifice 
her or their property for something that would benefit the broad public. Therefore, 
if an individual was forced to contribute unequally to something that was of public 
benefit, compensation was due.11 Compensation was meant to place the individual 
in the position she would have been in, had the expropriation not occurred. 
2.2 The centrality of market value 
Section 12(1) of the Expropriation Act sets out how compensation should be 
calculated, namely through the determination of the value that property would fetch 
in the open market. This amount is commonly referred to as the market value. The 
determination of market value as the compensation norm is based on the 
assumption that in the property market there will always be a free interchange 
between supply and demand. The rationale is that the market price will be 
determined by the economic principles of supply and demand, thereby determining 
                                        
10  Krause v SAR&H 1948 4 SA 554 (O) 562-563; Sandton Town Council v Erf 89 Sandown 
Extension 2 (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 576 (W) 579; Oosthuizen v SAR&H 1928 WLD 52 62. 
11  This links with what the French refer to as "égalité devant les charges publiques" and the 
Germans as "Aufopferung", implying that every member of the public should contribute to 
society's burdens according to that person's abilities. See Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 3. 




the "equivalent in value ... of the property loss".12 This method of calculation was 
adopted in South African case law.13 
2.2.1 The problem with market value 
Market value is a problematic concept because in transactions of sale the market is 
a relatively unrestrained phenomenon where sellers and buyers bargain until they 
reach an acceptable price level, and such bargaining is usually done without many 
artificial constraints. The problem thus lies in the fact that one must imagine 
compensating a compulsory purchase in terms of exactly the opposite, namely a 
free market transaction where the price level is determined by the relatively free 
will of the buyer and the seller. The determination of market value is therefore an 
informed guess.14 
Further, market price is not static. Changes over time can influence the price, and 
inflation can play a big role. Events that lead to a sudden increase in the market 
price are often ignored, especially in cases where the comparative method15 is used 
to determine the market value and the properties used in comparison were sold 
before such rapid fluctuations took place.16 Such a determination of market value 
does not attempt to consider or capture the value of the properties to the owners 
themselves.17 
Notwithstanding the problems with this approach, the courts have usually found a 
way to apply the open market test, even where it has been very difficult to do so.18 
                                        
12  Estate Marks v Pretoria City Council 1969 3 SA 227 (A) 254. 
13  Estate Marks v Pretoria City Council 1969 3 SA 227 (A) 254. 
14  Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1973 3 SA 376 
(A); Minister of Lands and Natural Resources v Moresby-White 1978 2 SA 898 (RAD); Krause v 
SAR&H 1948 4 SA 554 (O). 
15  See para 0. 
16  See the arguments made in Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and 
Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012). 
17  For instance, if the owner is disabled and made renovations to accommodate this disability, this 
will not be taken into account when determining market value. 
18  Todd v Administrator Transvaal 1972 2 SA 874 (AD) 881-882; May v Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe; Thomas Family v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; Cairns Family Trust v Reserve Bank 




The market value test plays a central role in South African expropriation law, and 
in order to determine the market value one has to hypothesise what the property 
would have realised if sold on an open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer. 
But the willing buyer willing seller method of determining market value has also 
been described as illusory, since the bargaining process is constrained by a 
compulsory sale, and the seller is more often than not unwilling to sell.19 As King J 
stated in Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council:20 
Notwithstanding, the law enjoins me to transport myself into a world of fiction and 
to don the mantle of a super valuator, overriding, if necessary, the views 
expressed by men experienced in the valuation of property and whose views are 
relied upon almost daily by willing purchasers and sellers. I must at one and the 
same time be the willing seller and the willing buyer, both well-informed, and I 
must arrive at a price in a market that did not exist at the time of expropriation. 
This is sobecause I must ignore any enhancement or diminution in value flowing 
from the expropriation or the scheme causing the expropriation. It is an Alice in 
Wonderland world in which the consideration of principles of valuation and the 
opinions expressed by experienced property valuators make the task of the super 
valuator seemingly "curiouser and curiouser". 
Despite the Constitution requiring "just and equitable" compensation, not much has 
changed. 
3 The influence of the Constitution on the calculation of 
compensation 
3.1 Introduction 
The Constitution now provides a new framework in which the Expropriation Act 
should be interpreted. Section 25(2)(b) sets out the requirement that compensation 
is due upon expropriation. Section 25(3) determines that at the time of 
expropriation the amount of the compensation and the time and manner of 
                                        
of Zimbabwe; Frogmore Tobacco Estates (PVT) Ltd v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 1985 4 SA 
185 (ZH); Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1979 1 SA 949 
(W) 953; Minister of Agriculture v Estate Randeree 1979 1 SA 145 (A) 183. 
19  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 61.  
20  Southern Transvaal Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1979 1 SA 949 (W) 955-
956. 




payment must be just and equitable, striking an equitable balance between the 
person whose property is expropriated and the public interest. All relevant 
circumstances must be taken into account, including the factors listed in section 
25(3)(a)-(e).21 
3.2 The rationale of paying compensation 
The aim of compensation under the constitutional dispensation is, as in pre-
constitutional expropriation, not to oblige the individual on his or her own to carry 
the burden of something that is in the public benefit. However, the Constitution 
aims to do this by balancing the interest of the public with the interest of those 
affected (the individuals), and this might not always mean paying market value. 
Case law, however, seems to return to the pre-constitutional rationale for the 
payment of compensation. In Du Toit v Minister van Transport22 it was held that 
the expropriatee must be put in the same position he would have been in, but for 
the expropriation. In City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd23 
it was held that an owner may not be better or worse off because of the 
expropriation and that a monetary award must restore the status quo ante. 
Khumalo v Potgieter 24  stated that compensation is paid to ensure that the 
expropriatee is justly and equitably compensated for his loss, while Hermanus v 
Department of Land Affairs: In Re Erven 3535 and 3536, Goodwood25 ruled that 
the expropriatee is compensated for the loss of the property. This sentiment was 
echoed in Ex Parte Former Highlands Residents,26 where it was found that the 
interest of the expropriatee requires full indemnity when expropriated, and 
therefore it is possible to pay more than market value. In Haakdoornbult Boerdery 
                                        
21  See para 0. 
22  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 22. 
23  City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 1 (SCA) para 21. 
24  Khumalo v Potgieter 2000 2 All SA 456 (LCC) para 22. 
25  Hermanus v Department of Land Affairs: In Re Erven 3535 and 3536, Goodwood 2001 1 SA 
1030 (LCC) para 15. 
26  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) paras 34-35. 




CC v Mphela27 the court ruled that for compensation to be fair it must recompense. 
In other words, it must put the dispossessed, insofar as money can do it, in the 
same position the person would have been in had the land not been taken. This 
compensation might not always be market value, and it seems as if the court 
accepts that it can be something more than market value: 
[b]ecause of important structural and politico-cultural reasons indigenous people 
suffer disproportionately when displaced and Western concepts of expropriation 
and compensation are not always suitable when dealing with community-held 
tribal land. A wider range of socially relevant factors should consequently be taken 
into account, such as resettlement costs and, in appropriate circumstances, solace 
for emotional distress.28 
More recently, the court in Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform29 relied on several foreign dicta to show that the 
purpose of compensation is to recompense. The court regarded market value as an 
important circumstance to take into account when determining compensation. 
In Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa30 the Constitutional Court, 
in the context of a restitution claim, opted for the "generous construction [rather 
than] a merely textual or legalistic one to afford claimants the fullest possible 
protection of their constitutional guarantees". 31  However, when calculating 
compensation the court warned that the burden on the fiscus was an important 
consideration, as compensation claims are paid from taxpayer's money and 
therefore need to advance a public purpose.32 The court thus acknowledged the 
proportionality, or the balance, that is required between the interest of the 
individual and that of the public. 
                                        
27  Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC v Mphela 2007 5 SA 596 (SCA) para 48. 
28  Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC v Mphela 2007 5 SA 596 (SCA) para 48. 
29  Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 
(19 April 2012). 
30  Florence v Government of the RSA 2014 6 SA 456 (CC). 
31  Florence v Government of the RSA 2014 6 SA 456 (CC) para 48. 
32  Florence v Government of the RSA 2014 6 SA 456 (CC) para 71. 




Despite the focus on recompensing the individual, the central principle should 
remain that the amount of compensation should reflect an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. This balance must 
be established with reference to the relevant circumstances. This requires looking 
at each case individually with regard to the individual property interest that might 
stem from the pre-constitutional era, and the constitutional framework and its 
legitimate reform efforts. A decision on what is just and equitable cannot be made 
in the abstract without due regard to the context of the expropriation, but should 
take into account the broader scheme of the Constitution.33 
3.3 Factors that must be taken into account to determine "just and 
equitable" compensation 
3.3.1 Application of the factors 
The Constitution directs a valuer to consider a list of factors that must be taken into 
account when considering what is "just and equitable" compensation. Subsections 
25(3)(a)-(e) may not be applicable in all cases, and it might be that in certain 
circumstances a particular subsection is more relevant than others are. However, it 
is important that all relevant circumstances be taken into account in every case, 
including those circumstances or factors that might be relevant but not listed in 
section 25(3). 
The courts are left to interpret how these factors interact with one another, and in 
Ex Parte Former Highlands Residents, 34  Gildenhuys J formulated a two-step 
approach when calculating compensation. The court concluded that market value 
plays a central role.35 Therefore, when calculating compensation the courts should 
                                        
33  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 509. 
34  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) paras 34-35. 
35  This is not entirely true. Many jurisdictions acknowledge that compensation need not be market 
value. This is particularly so in Germany, where what is required is an equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. See for example BVerfGE 24, 
367 [1968] (Hamburgisches Deichordnungsgesetz). 




first determine the market value of the property (since it is easily quantifiable),36 
and then, based on the list in section 25(3), adjust the amount either upwards or 
downwards.37 Market value is to be elevated to a central or starting position in 
determining compensation, with the factors in the discretion of the judge 
determining by how much the compensation should be increased or decreased. The 
Constitutional Court in Du Toit v Minister of Transport38 adopted this approach: 
The approach of beginning with the consideration of market value […] and 
thereafter deciding whether the amounts are just and equitable is not novel. […] 
Nevertheless, the judge pointed out that the market value of the expropriated 
property could become the starting point in the application of section 25(3) of the 
Constitution since it is one of the few factors in the section which is readily 
quantifiable. Thereafter, an amount may be added or subtracted as the relevant 
circumstances in section 25(3) may require. […] For this reason, the approach 
adopted here which applies the Act as a starting point and proceeds to apply 
section 25(3) of the Constitution may not be suitable in all cases. It is, however, 
the most practicable one in the circumstances of this case where there is no 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. 
The factors in the list can play a significant role in the valuation of "just and 
equitable" compensation, and will be discussed briefly below.39 
3.3.2 Current use of the property 
The first factor in section 25(3)(a) provides that the current use of the property 
could be a relevant circumstance that could influence the amount of the 
compensation. This cannot be used as a merely punitive measure as to do so would 
be against the public purpose.40 This means that the owner cannot be punished for 
not using the land in a certain way.41 It remains necessary to balance the interest 
                                        
36  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-60 rightly notes that market value is 
preferred because it is seen as "objective", but yet it is difficult to determine the exact market 
value because there are many variables that need to be considered when determining it. 
37  Ex parte former Highland Residents: In Re Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
(LCC) paras 34-35. 
38  Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 37. 
39  A more detailed account can be found at Du Plessis Compensation for Expropriation 105. 
40  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 512-513. 
41  For example: if an owner is not using agricultural land for agricultural purposes, this cannot be 
a reason for a downward adjustment. 




of those affected with the public interest. The use of the property could be 
applicable in cases such as President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd:42 when land is occupied unlawfully, and the market value is 
depressed because of it, the court could adjust compensation upwards to counter 
the negative effect of the unlawful occupation.43 
3.3.3 The history of the acquisition and use of the property 
It is not only the current use of the property but also the history of the acquisition 
of the property that can influence the compensation amount. Section 25(3)(b) 
includes cases where the apartheid state expropriated property and sold it well 
below market value.44 In many of these cases the state made land available to 
white farmers at well below market value. 45  If such an owner were now 
expropriated for land reform purposes, it would be unfair to offer full market value 
compensation. Such an owner should not be allowed to benefit twice from 
apartheid.46 
In Mhlanganisweni 47  the claimants argued that the owners do not need "full 
compensation" and that an owner can be required to make some compromises due 
to the historic benefits the owner had received. This was rejected by Gildenhuys J, 
as "one should not distinguish between 'rich' landowners and others in the 
determination of compensation".48 The court held that as a matter of equity, rich 
people should not be considered as second-rate citizens when it comes to 
expropriation. 
                                        
42  President of the RSA v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
43  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-60; Van der Walt 2005 SAJHR 144-
161. 
44  Du Plessis and Olivier 1997 BPLD 11. 
45  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-59. 
46  Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1-59; Badenhorst 1998 De Jure 261. 
47  Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 
(19 April 2012). 
48  Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 
(19 April 2012) para 61. 




3.3.4 Market value 
Section 25(3)(c) lists market value as a factor to take into account when calculating 
just and equitable compensation. Market value in section 25(3)(c) probably has the 
same meaning as market value in section 12 of the Expropriation Act, although 
market value is not the main consideration in section 25(3). 
3.3.5 Direct state invstment / subsidy 
Section 25(3)(d) refers to instances where the acquisition by the person 
expropriated and the capital improvement made to such property was made to the 
land with the assistance of the (apartheid) state.49 The rationale underlying this 
subsection is that the (current) state should not compensate an owner for 
improvements that the owner made with (apartheid) state subsidies, as it would 
not be just and equitable to do so.50 
3.3.6 The purpose of the expropriation 
Section 25(3)(e) requires the valuer to have regard to the purpose of the 
expropriation. In this regard section 25(3)(e) is complemented by section 25(4), 
which states that public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform. 
Section 25(4) therefore circumscribes the content of public interest, while section 
25(3)(e) is about the role that public purpose plays in compensation. This should 
also be distinguished from the requirement in section 25(2)(a)51 that expropriation 
must be for a public purpose. 
These five factors should be taken into account when determining the amount of 
compensation to be paid, but the valuer is not restricted to these factors alone. 
  
                                        
49  This applies only to direct subsidies in respect to the property. 
50  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 512. 
51  See Du Plessis "Public Purpose Requirement" for a more detailed discussion on the purpose of 
the expropriation factor. 




4 The valuation of the land 
4.1 Introduction 
Valuers must estimate an amount of compensation based on established practical 
reasoning.52 These lines of reasoning are not rules of law but rules of valuation.53 
In South Africa the Property Valuers Profession Act 47 of 2000 regulates valuers. 
They serve as expert witnesses and make use of certain valuation methods to 
calculate "value".54  Valuators must provide the court with evidence of what a 
hypothetical willing buyer would pay for the expropriated property and what a 
hypothetical willing seller would accept. 
Within the confines of section 12 of the Expropriation Act, courts use mainly three 
methods to determine market value. They are the comparative approach, the 
economic approach and the land residual technique. These methods present the 
court with evidence relating to the estimation of the market value of the property. 
The methods discussed below are the most common methods used in pre-
constitutional case law, but are the methods still being used to evaluate property 
for various purposes, including expropriation. Note how all of these methods aim 
at calculating the "objective" market value of the property. 
4.2 The comparative sales or market data approach 
According to Jacobs,55 the definition of this approach is "the consideration of actual 
sales of like lands in a like area and a determination from such comparison of the 
going market value of the lands in question at the date of expropriation". The 
                                        
52  Gildenhuys "Valuations, Valuers and Appraisers" para 177. 
53  Valuators play a central role in determining the value of the property. Therefore, their 
reputation and competence are often subjected to questioning. See Minister van Waters v 
Theron 1856 52 ER 1219 1223. 
54  Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 
(19 April 2012) para 26. If a judge does not accept expert testimony, the judge must make 
clear in the judgment why it is rejected. See Estate Marks v Pretoria City Council 1969 3 SA 
227 (A) 252-253. 
55  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 101; Minister van Waterwese v Von During 1971 1 SA 858 (A). 




method is based on the idea that a willing buyer would not pay more for land if he 
could get comparable land elsewhere more cheaply.56 This approach has been 
imported into South African case law and is regarded as the most effective way of 
determining value.57 
This method is used to determine market value, "rather than upon [speculating] as 
to the prices notional willing sellers and notional willing buyers would have agreed 
upon had they entered into contracts of sale".58 It is generally regarded as a method 
that reduces speculation about prices.59 
The most relevant and least technical principle that is applicable when determining 
what must be included in or excluded from such a calculation is that the price the 
owner paid for the property may be referred to, especially if the property was 
bought just before expropriation. 60  Only transactions at arm's length can be 
regarded as indicators of the market value.61 The expropriation price paid for 
comparable land can also be used as a factor to help determine the amount, but 
the expropriation cannot be elevated to a sales transaction.62 
The properties used for comparison must be sufficiently similar to the property 
being expropriated to justify the comparison. Where there are discrepancies, the 
                                        
56  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 1, 7. 
57  Todd v Minister of Public Works 1958 1 SA 328 (A) 380; Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v M & K 
Trust & Finansiële Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1973 3 SA 376 (A) 390; Southern Transvaal 
Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1979 1 SA 949 (W) 956; Van Zyl v Stadsraad 
van Ermelo 1979 3 SA 549 (AD) 568; Thanam v Minister of Lands 1970 4 SA 85 (D). See 
Minister van Waterwese v Von During 1971 1 SA 858 (A) 872, where the court states that no 
two properties are the same, not even those adjacent to each other, but that this method is 
nonetheless the most reliable method of determining market value. The difference in property 
is merely a factor that should be taken into account when determining market value. 
58  In Minister of Lands and Natural Resources v Moresby-White 1978 2 SA 898 (RAD) the court 
per Macdonald CJ states that the property used for comparison must be property sold on the 
open market, and not some form of compulsory sale. 
59  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 102. Opera House (Grand Parade) Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Town Municipality 1989 2 SA 670 (C) 667; Minister van Waterwese v Von During 1971 1 SA 
858 (A) 872. 
60  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 103. 
61  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 104, 107. 
62  Minister van Waterwese v Von During 1971 1 SA 858 (A). 




valuator is expected to be creative and to take into account any facts that might 
influence the mind of the (hypothetical) purchaser.63 Employing his/her "skill and 
experience in deciding what a purchaser, if one were to appear, would be likely to 
give" would do this.64 
The obvious problem with this approach is that there may be no comparable 
properties, or the property standing to be expropriated may have a unique 
feature.65 In Durban Corporation v Lewis66 the court ruled that in cases where "the 
land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features" the 
arbitrator has to consider all the material in front of him and determine "what a 
willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the 
land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities".67 Similarly, 
in Minister of Agriculture v Davey68 the court noted that adjustments often need to 
be made to allow for dissimilarities between properties, that this requires a judge 
to meddle with the evidence, and that these adjustments are often difficult to 
convert to monetary terms. In Sher v Administrator, Transvaal69 the court stated 
that the valuation before it did not account for the property's unique characteristics. 
In Minister of Agriculture v Davey70 the court found that although the comparative 
method was the best method to employ, the evidence on which it rests must be 
considered with care. One has to take into account that property is acquired in 
different circumstances, and that no two properties are exactly similar. In Minister 
van Waterwese v Von During71 the fact that there was no other comparable land 
                                        
63  Pietermaritzburg Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd 1911 AD 501 516. 
64  Pietermaritzburg Corporation v South African Breweries Ltd 1911 AD 501 516. Also see Estate 
Marks v Pretoria City Council 1969 3 SA 227 (AD) 254. 
65  If one compares thoroughly, certain properties will always have a unique feature that cannot 
be included in such a simple comparison. Arumäe and Kein 2014 Journal of Management and 
Change 17. 
66  Durban Corporation v Lewis 1942 NPD 24. 
67  Durban Corporation v Lewis 1942 NPD 24 49. 
68  Minister of Agriculture v Davey 1981 3 SA 877 (A) 903A-B. 
69  Sher v Administrator, Transvaal 1990 4 SA 545 (A) 565. 
70  Minister of Agriculture v Davey 1981 3 SA 877 (A) 903. 
71  Minister van Waterwese v Von During 1971 1 SA 858 (A) 904. 




did not mean that the property was without value. In such cases, reasons for the 
inactivity in an area should be treated as opinion evidence and with caution. 
While the comparative sales method can help a great deal, especially where there 
are similar proprieties available with enough sales data, the data should always be 
treated with caution, and it should be noted that valuers in this instance at best 
make an informed guess as to what a willing buyer might pay and a willing seller 
might accept. 
4.3 The economic or income capitalisation approach 
This approach requires the valuator to value the expropriated property by 
capitalising its net rental income.72 This approach assumes that a buyer would not 
pay more for land providing a certain income if he could get a similar income 
elsewhere for less. 73  This method is used mostly to determine the value of 
investment properties. 
When valuing property this way, it is only the income from the property and not 
the income that the management or the specific use of the property generates that 
is taken into account.74 There are also two ways of determining the income. Direct 
capitalisation uses an estimate of expected income to indicate value.75 The yield 
capitalisation method, a very complex method, discounts future benefits to present 
value on the assumption that the investor will recover the capital investment plus 
a rate of return over the course of the investment period.76 The court in Bonnet v 
Department of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure77 noted that this is "a system 
whereby you discount six uncertainties to the fifth decimal point". In general, courts 
are reluctant to use it due to its complexities. 
                                        
72  Jacobs Law of Expropriation 121-123. 
73  Gildenhuys 1977 TSAR 7. 
74  White v Union Government 1937 CPD 225 228. 
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It has been stated that the land residual technique is a form of this method.78 This 
valuation method first looks at the purpose for which the land was purchased by 
the expropriatee. Thereafter the cost of improvements to get the land suitable for 
such a purpose is deducted. Revenue is estimated by putting a sales value on the 
property, and added to the total. The total is discounted against the time it will take 
to develop the land.79 In Estate Marks v Pretoria City Council80 the court explained: 
The residual land value method is a complicated exercise involving specialised 
skills in several spheres. The first step is to determine the optimum development 
of which the land proposed to be purchased is capable. If it is to be properly done, 
that entails the preparation of a comprehensive building project, complete with 
plans and specifications, which complies with all relevant building regulations and 
town-planning provisions. Thereupon the cost of erecting such a building has to 
be calculated, as also the estimated nett rentals to be derived from the building. 
Such nett income is then capitalised at the rate of interest which the prospective 
purchaser expects from his or her investment. From this capitalised value, the 
total cost of the project is deducted, and the residual figure represents the amount 
which a purchaser would probably be prepared to pay for the site in question. 
This method is extremely complicated, and in applying it the court will have to give 
careful thought to what variables should or should not be included. While this might 
seem very arithmetic and objective, such choices are informed by an adjudicator's 
perception of what a hypothetical purchaser on a non-existent open market would 
consider. 
4.4 The cost approach 
This technique rests on the assumption that a person would not pay more for 
renovating or upgrading property than s/he would spend on similar renovations 
elsewhere.81 When the valuer determines the value of the land plus improvements, 
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Law of Expropriation 130. 
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the valuer must also keep in mind the depreciation of the improvements on the 
property.82 
This is seen as a less desirable method of determining market value,83 since taking 
into account more variables means that there is greater uncertainty. Not only must 
the valuer try to ascertain the value of the empty stand, plus the construction costs, 
but depreciation also has to be taken into account. The land and the buildings often 
need to be assessed separately.84 
This method was employed in Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v 
Department of Land Affairs,85 where the Land Claims Court had to determine 
retrospectively if just and equitable compensation had been paid for properties 
expropriated during apartheid, and found that86 
... the value of the dispossessed properties … [is] … the aggregate of the vacant 
land and the depreciated replacement cost of the improvements. This is not always 
what happens in practice. In this case, it is the only practical method. I am satisfied 
that the agreement on the contributory value of improvements, as reached 
between the valuers, is fair and equitable, and that the Court may act upon it in 
determining the market value of the dispossessed properties. 
To determine the value of the empty stand the court used the comparative sales 
method, but not without difficulty, because the various valuers gave the court 
different values. Ironically, the court still insisted that market value had to be 
objectively determined.87 
  
                                        
82  Bay View (Pty) Ltd v Director of Valuations 1982 4 All SA 366 (C). 
83  It is not a popular method and was rejected in Opera House (Grand Parade) Restaurant (Pty) 
Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1989 2 SA 670 (C) 677 but was used in Southern Transvaal 
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86  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
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87  Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 
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4.5 Alternative methods of determining market value 
4.5.1 Introduction  
There are also methods of calculating market value not readily looked at in South 
African courts but employed in American courts. Such courts seem to make definite 
choices about what interests to protect when calculating market value, and know 
how different methods can bring about different results, depending on the interests 
that the adjudicator chooses to protect. This raises the question: if market value 
can have such a diverse range of possibilities, why is it still the central focus, and 
why is it believed to be the only sure way of determining value? But also: why is 
the "just and equitable" measure perceived to be less sure than market value? 
4.5.2 Harm v benefit 
In the harm/gain methods the courts must choose to focus either on the 
expropriatee's harms or on the government's benefit. When focusing on harm, the 
court assesses compensation by looking at the expropriatee,88 which focus may 
lead to higher compensation if the owner has a special use of the property that 
would not be reflected in the market value, for instance where the owner's other 
property is next to the property that is taken. 
The focus on government gain can also lead to higher compensation. 89 Where 
government gains are difficult to determine, such as where the government 
regulates for environmental gains, the courts tend to focus on the owner's loss. The 
government's gain will therefore be considered mostly when the government 
expropriates property to facilitate a commercial enterprise.90 
                                        
88  This seems to be the case in Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2003 1 SA 586 (C); Minister of 
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90  Serkin 2004-2005 NWULR 689. 




4.5.3 The highest and best use 
The courts often determine compensation by looking at the highest / best use of 
the property. In the United States of America it is argued that this would be the 
value that is attached to the property in the market, based on the willing buyer 
willing seller principle. 91  The compensation amount will therefore involve a 
determination of what the highest / best use of the property is by assuming that a 
seller will sell the property based on the highest / best use, even if the buyer will 
not use the property for such a purpose. 
Highest and best use allocates the financial risk of developing the property from its 
current condition to its highest and best use.92 The risks of the development (permit 
denial, environmental regulations etc) and the question of who is to bear these risks 
are reflected in the property's market value and thus influence the calculation of 
compensation.93 
Because there are many factors that the court chooses from when determining the 
value in this case, coupled with all the variables such as the risk of permit denial, 
insurance costs etc, it is debatable whether such a method is really dependable and 
can really determine what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. And since the 
court does not need to give reasons for the choice of factors to include when 
determining the amount, it cannot be said to be an objective method of calculating 
market value.94 
While not directly employed as a value method in Mhlanganisweni,95 the court did 
make extensive mention of the use of the land as a luxury game lodge. In this 
context the court had to determine if the land should be restored to the claimants, 
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which restoration, according to the court, would require the state to expropriate 
the property at its full market value for reform purposes.96 The court warned that 
the restoration of the land by expropriating the current owner at market value 
should not place a great cost on the state, as this would lead to overcompensation 
of the claimants at the public expense.97 
4.5.4 Permissible but unenacted regulations 
Under this valuation mechanism the courts decide where they will draw the line in 
offsetting the value for permissible regulations. For existing regulations this is 
simple, but property is of course also subject to unenacted regulations. These are 
restrictions that the government can still validly impose. What is required here is to 
imagine our willing buyers and sellers discounting the impact of potential 
regulation.98 
In the South African context this will play a role in land reform policies. A good 
example of this is the Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land and 
Framework Bill,99which states that land may be taken at below market value if it is 
not used at its highest potential for food production. The possible under-utilisation 
would influence the price that the state would offer if the land were not used in 
accordance with the Bill, once enacted. 
4.5.5 Benefit offset and the average reciprocity of advantage 
Sometimes regulations can benefit a property owner. Where there is only a partial 
taking, the remaining property might benefit from it. The argument is, if an owner 
                                        
96  See Du Plessis "Public Purpose Requirement" for criticism of this interpretation. 
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benefits from a governmental action, the owner should not be compensated for 
such benefit.100 Of course, the problem is how broadly the court should interpret 
the term "benefit". The broader the benefit (i.e. only specific benefits or the more 
abstract benefit to the community), the less the compensation.101 
4.5.6 External factors that can influence the amount 
4.5.6.1 The timing of the valuation 
Properties are generally evaluated on the date of the expropriation.102 The problem 
might be that the prospect of expropriation might influence value.103 How should 
courts respond to this? Should they insist that compensation should be calculated 
at the date of expropriation, or determine where the de facto expropriation started, 
and determine the value of the property then? Clearly this could have an impact on 
the property value.104 
The Constitutional Court in Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa105 
had to decide if the compensation payable should be calculated at the date of 
dispossession or the date that actual compensation is paid. The court stated that106 
Measuring the position at the time that actual compensation takes place allows 
the dispossessed person to benefit from the appreciation of the land, or the 
interest that would likely have accrued on the monetary value of the property, had 
they received just compensation, in the intervening years. The claimant ought to 
receive this benefit because she was deprived of a low-risk, interest-accruing, 
long-term asset, namely property. It seems unjust to strip someone of such an 
asset and to replace it with the present-day equivalent of a non-interest-accruing 
amount 44 years later. 
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101  Serkin 2004-2005 NWULR 696. 
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In restitution cases such as Florence, where claimants cannot get actual restoration 
of land but must opt for monetary compensation instead, timing can make a big 
difference.107 
4.5.6.2 Fees and expenses 
A factor that is often overlooked is the impact of litigation expenses on the 
compensation claim. When costs are awarded in litigation about compensation, this 
can effectively mean either that the State is paying more than the market value for 
the property or that the property owner is not in a better position than he would 
have been but for the expropriation.108 Spoor109 warns that this may be a big 
unintended consequence of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014, since the Act 
restricts the government to expropriations, and no longer allows the possibility of 
settlement based on negotiations. This also means that while the landowner 
possibly litigates on the compensation offered, the land claimants will be without 
land until the issue is settled. Mention of the litigation cost in the calculation of 
compensation was acknowledged in Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC v Mphela.110 
4.5.6.3 Re-characterising the property expropriated  
In general, the subjective value of property to the owner is excluded when 
calculating compensation.111 It could be argued that courts do have some discretion 
(especially in the South African context under section 25(3)) to consider some of 
the subjective values. What the court therefore chooses to ignore or include will 
ultimately affect the market value of the property.112 
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4.6 Some comments on the valuation methods 
It is evident that the choice of valuation mechanism can influence the so-called 
market value of property. In some cases it is possible to ascertain the market value 
of a certain property, but what this section has shown is that assumptions about 
the objectivity of the mechanisms chosen to ascertain market value are false. These 
are choices made by the courts, and the mechanisms are not as objective or clear 
as the courts would like to believe. Choosing a valuation mechanism necessarily 
entails making background decisions about the extent to which private property will 
be protected, thereby advancing substantive property interests. 
Why is this relevant? By synchronising the underlying goals a person wishes to 
achieve with a property clause with the valuation mechanisms, compensation can 
be used to support substantive goals. As Serkin puts it, "at least ensure that 
valuation decisions are not at odds with the results they are trying to achieve".113 
For instance, if the goal of compensation for expropriation is to ensure that the 
government internalises the costs of expropriation by expropriating only if the gain 
is more than the costs, then compensation should be paid to make an owner 
whole.114 If government interference in private property is regarded as suspect, it 
should pay the highest possible price. 115  When there is hostility towards 
government regulation of property, parties will try to force the government to pay 
the full market value and make it as expensive as possible for the government to 
expropriate property. This will limit government's interference with private 
property.116 To do this, courts might try to shift the litigation expenses to the 
government.117 That would deter the government from expropriating property. 
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On the other hand, some people might accept that the government tries to act in 
the best interest of the community. Public problems can be solved with legislative 
decision-making, and lower compensation would allow economically effective 
legislating. 118  This would mean that a mechanism that allows for unenacted 
regulations to impact on value119 and that places all the risks of the highest and 
best use of the property on the owner 120  would lead to the award of lower 
compensation. Compensation would in this case not be a barrier to the 
implementation of transformation through legislation. 
A redistributive approach to compensation situates property rights in a social space 
that facilitates the existence of different levels of wealth in society. In this context, 
government protection of private property has certain consequences for the 
distribution of wealth. If property rights are protected rigidly, then the status quo 
will be protected. If we have a more flexible approach to property, greater 
redistribution is possible.121 Such a regime will favour people with less wealth and 
power, and courts will try to make it less expensive for government to impose 
restrictions on the property rights of the wealthy and powerful.122 In this instance 
the award of compensation would be the outcome of a contextual inquiry and a 
normative determination of whether a particular person deserves more or less 
protection. Compensation might vary, depending on the wealth of the owner. The 
use of this mechanism could be accompanied by the use of the benefit-offset 
mechanism,123 for instance. 
While all of these mechanisms have the goal of calculating fair market value in the 
United States, as opposed to just and equitable compensation, they do illustrate 
the possibility of choosing different methods and placing emphasis on different 
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factors to achieve different results. Serkin124 also successfully shows how the courts 
sometimes employ such mechanisms mechanically, without introspection or 
attempting to establish exactly what substantive interest they are protecting when 
choosing method x rather than method y. 
In South Africa our goal is set out clearly in the Constitution. Compensation must 
be "just and equitable", and it must reflect a balance between the interest of the 
holder of the property rights and the interest of the public. Especially in the context 
of land reform, this necessitates taking a contextual approach in which courts will 
have to make decisions on when the owner's interest will be advanced at the 
public's cost. A blanket acceptance of market value as the value to be awarded is 
therefore problematic. It has been successfully argued that a progressive 
expropriation regime will provide better protection for the economically and 
politically marginalised by allowing the government to burden the property of the 
wealthy and the powerful somewhat more during expropriation.125 This would mean 
that in the Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land 
Reform126 it would have been acceptable for the Land Claims Court to burden the 
property rights of the owners by choosing to deviate from the strict market value 
and thus discriminating against them due to their wealth. 
5 Conclusion 
Since owners can seldom resist expropriation, most expropriation cases focus on 
the compensation element. It should be noted from the outset that neither the 
Constitution of the United States of America (on which most of the literature 
discussed in this article is based) nor the South African Constitution demands the 
award of full market value: both demand just and equitable compensation.127 Since 
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the Constitution has brought about a single system of law, it is in this context that 
compensation for expropriation should be calculated. This means that the centrality 
of market value and of the pre-constitutional valuation methods used to calculate 
it can no longer be the accepted. Market value is just one factor to be taken into 
consideration when evaluating just compensation.128 The protection of existing 
rights in the determination of compensation does not need to stand opposed to the 
goal of transformation. Both goals should be taken into account in calculating the 
extent of "just and equitable" compensation. 
Pre-constitutional compensation was aimed at placing the individual in the position 
she would have been in, had the expropriation not occurred. Compensation was 
interpreted as meaning "full compensation", and market value was the measure 
used to determine this compensation. But market value is not unproblematic. The 
fiction that the "willing-buyer willing-seller" system creates, and the supposed 
objectivity of the methods employed could fool a person into accepting that the 
system is objective. However, as has been shown above, when valuers and judges 
as super valuers make choices on what factors, properties or figures to include in 
the determination of compensation, they often do so with the aim of protecting a 
substantive property interest. In pre-constitutional case law the aim was often to 
compensate the owner fully, thereby choosing to protect ownership. In pre-
constitutional expropriation law this was acceptable. 
This, of course, places not only a stringent duty on the valuers that are called as 
expert witnesses in cases to determine value, but it also requires a judge to 
consciously analyse the valuation reports in front of her. No method, no matter how 
reasonable it seems to be, can be utterly conclusive. The courts, however, must yet 
                                        
Sup Ct Rev 95 examines three cases where World War II regulations dealt with the issue of 
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consider the best evidence presented and arrive at a conclusion based on it. The 
courts have acknowledged this much,129 and often accept market value to be a 
mere estimate. 
But the Constitution as a single system of law now requires a balancing of the 
interest of the individual with that of the public. In that sense, we have moved more 
towards the German position, where the owner's rights are balanced with the 
obligations that ownership entails in a social context. The Constitution requires that 
a balance be struck between protecting individual rights and advancing societal 
goals, especially in the context of land reform, which is specifically provided for in 
section 25. This means that a compensation practice that favours the individual 
owner can no longer be the norm, and a re-consideration of how compensation 
should be calculated is needed. 
What is important is that judges as valuers should realise that their decisions have 
implications for the property order. Choosing to ignore the contexts of the 
expropriation (such as land reform) means that the judge wilfully disregards the 
transformation oriented goals of the Constitution. Emphasis on full compensation 
at market value makes a definite choice for the protection of property that may be 
at the cost of the public. It might not balance the interest of the owner against the 
public, as the Constitution requires. Judges as valuers should constantly be mindful 
what interest they are protecting when they determine compensation. If judges are 
restricting government power, the focus will be on compensating the individual as 
fully as possible. This means employing strict market value compensation. This 
might be "just and equitable" in certain circumstances, but would probably not be 
so in land reform cases, where the implementation of legislation promulgated 
specifically in terms of section 25 of the Constitution should not be hampered by 
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an insistence on the award of full market value compensation, as happened in 
Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform.130 
So what is the solution? What are the tools that a judge must use to arrive at "just 
and equitable" compensation, if the only quantifiable factor is market value? The 
two-step approach that was developed in the courts is not ideal. A better starting 
point would be accepting that the goal is not "market value" but "just and equitable" 
compensation. This would enable a judge at times to consider including evidence 
on or considerations such as the economic standing of an owner in determining 
what an equitable amount of compensation would be. It might encourage a judge 
to consider discounting compensation, if the goal that the expropriating legislation 
wishes to achieve requires the owner's rights to give way to the bigger public 
purpose. In short: it requires a contextual determination of compensation that aims 
at the "just and equitable" rather than at market value compensation. The use of 
more rigid or precise tools is not feasible and would hamper a contextual 
determination of just and equitable compensation. The tool we have is the 
Constitution, which tells us where we ought to go. It is up to valuers to get us there. 
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